This blog post examines the institutional conditions under which consensus and majority democracy generate differing policy outcomes, analyzing how variations in power structures affect representativeness and efficiency.
Democratic systems are classified as ‘consensus democracy’ or ‘majority democracy’ based on the degree of power concentration, dispersion, or sharing. The former is a system that maximizes the number of political actors sharing power, thereby maximizing the majority, and operates government based on broad consensus among them. In contrast, the latter is characterized by a single-party government that exercises exclusive power through majority rule, while maintaining clear accountability.
Reifert systematically analyzed the characteristics of consensus democracy in countries where society is pluralistic due to ethnicity, religion, language, etc., and where coalition governments among representative parties are commonplace. He measured the institutional patterns of power concentration or dispersion by applying the ‘party-executive branch’ axis and the ‘unitary-federal’ axis. The former axis includes the party system, electoral system, form of government, legislature-executive relations, and interest group system. The latter axis considers the degree of local decentralization, unicameral-bicameral structure, difficulty of constitutional amendment, independence of the constitutional court, and the existence and independence of the central bank.
Each factor exhibits contrasting tendencies based on the degree of power concentration or dispersion inherent in the system. For instance, countries with relatively more parties, higher proportionality between votes and seats in parliamentary composition, a high proportion of coalition governments, weaker executive authority, and a system where local interest group representation is centralized toward the state are assessed as exhibiting more consensual tendencies. Conversely, countries with strong central government power concentration, unicameral parliaments, constitutional amendment procedures as easy as ordinary law amendments, weak independent judicial review of constitutionality, and weak central bank independence are assessed as exhibiting stronger majoritarian tendencies.
The two systems also show differences in policy outcomes. Consensus democracy does not show significant differences in economic growth, but it is evaluated as relatively superior in socioeconomic equality, political participation, and reducing corruption. The empirical finding that power-sharing, which may appear unstable at first glance, actually faithfully embodies the fundamental values of democracy has drawn considerable attention. For this reason, attempts to introduce a consensus-based political system are emerging not only in newly independent nations with deep social divisions but also in advanced nations traditionally classified as majority-rule democracies.
However, the dispersion and sharing of power are not necessarily superior to its concentration. When designing a nation’s political system, it is essential to meticulously consider the centrifugal and centripetal forces of power inherent in each institution, as well as the effects of their mutual interaction. This can be examined through constitutional design within a presidential system. Here, two axes operate critically: the axis of ‘presidential sole authority’ and the axis of ‘alignment/separation of objectives’ between the president and the legislature.
First, the constitutional and legal powers of the president significantly influence the structure of cooperation with the legislature. Strong presidential powers imply the president is the ultimate policy decision-maker, making it difficult for minority parties to secure policy influence through power-sharing. Conversely, when presidential powers are weak, the president requires legislative cooperation for efficient policy implementation, and minority parties are actively considered as coalition partners in this process.
Second, the alignment/separation of objectives refers to the extent to which the president and the parliamentary majority share similar political preferences, respond jointly to the demands of the social majority, and can bear shared responsibility. Key institutional factors influencing this alignment include parliamentary seat allocation rules, differences in the election cycles of the president and parliament, variations in constituency size, and the characteristics of the presidential election system. For instance, a parliamentary system with single-member districts, simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections, matching constituency sizes for both, and a presidential runoff system tend to enhance purpose alignment. When these elements combine, they strengthen the majority-based centripetal force of governmental power. This promotes efficient responsible politics but also increases the potential for exclusive power exercise by a single party.
Conversely, proportional representation, separate elections, differing constituency sizes for the president and parliament, and a simple majority election system for the president create distinct majorities represented by the president and parliament, increasing the separation of objectives. When these elements combine, they strengthen the centrifugal force of governmental power. In this case, the need for power sharing through consensus among political actors grows, but simultaneously, excessive power dispersion increases the number of veto players, posing a risk of heightened political gridlock.
Existing studies have generally recommended strengthening presidential authority when the separation of objectives is high, and conversely, reducing it when the alignment of objectives is high. However, the actual effects produced by institutional coupling can vary depending on how specific institutional elements are combined and the political and social environment in which that combination operates. Considering these complex interactions, democratic system design must go beyond the simple choice between power concentration or dispersion. It must instead meticulously grasp the dynamics created by the structural combination of institutions to secure sustainable political stability and representativeness.
